

























Dynamics of Output Growth, Consumption and Physical Capital 


















Department of Economics and Related Studies 
University of York 
Heslington 




The Company You Keep: 




Bipasa Datta and Clive D Fraser The Company You Keep: Qualitative Uncertainty
in Providing Club Goods.1
Bipasa Datta
Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Y01 5DD




Department of Economics, University of Leicester, LE1 7RL
Tel: (44) (0) 116 252 5364; Fax: (44) (0) 116 252 5351
E-mail: cdf2@le.ac.uk
Version: 25 July 2006
Clubs are typically experience goods. Potential members cannot ascertain precisely
beforehand their quality (dependent endogenously on the club￿ s facility investment and
number of users, itself dependent on its pricing policy). Members with unsatisfactory ini-
tial experiences discontinue visits. We show that a monopoly pro￿t maximiser never o⁄ers
a free trial period for such goods but, for a quality function homogeneous of any feasible
degree, a welfare maximiser always does. When the quality function is homogeneous of
degree zero, the monopolist provides a socially excessive level of quality to repeat buyers.
In other possible regimes, the monopolist permits too little club usage.
Keywords: Clubs, Qualitative Uncertainty, Monopoly, Welfarist.
JEL Classi￿cation: D42, D80, D60, H4.
1. INTRODUCTION
Club goods - e.g., transport, health, education and leisure facilities - are impor-
tant and pervasive. This article studies optimum provision and pricing rules for a
1A very preliminary version was presented at PSERC, University of Leicester, and an
IFS/ESRC/Warwick Mini-Conference on the Environment and Externalities at Warwick Uni-
versity. Thanks to Todd Sandler for comments at the latter. We also thank Peter Simmons,
Claudio Mezzetti and seminar participants at Exeter, the PEUK Conference in Bristol and the
CEPET Workshop in Udine for comments on this version.
2Corresponding author.
1club good. The quality of the club good is increasing in the supplier￿ s investment
in the club facility and decreasing in the usage of it. We compare the provision
and pricing by a monopolist and a welfare maximiser to show that the monopolist
is likely to over-provide quality and allow too little use of the club relative to the
welfare optimum.
The particular feature of club goods that we emphasize is the qualitative un-
certainty consumers face as club goods are essentially experience goods. Ex ante,
a potential club user is uncertain how agreeable she will ￿nd membership. E.g.,
in a leisure club, the water in the swimming pool might be too tepid or too en-
ervating, the food be more than she can stomach, maybe cigarette smoke gets in
her eye or passive smoking just gets up her nose. Again, a consumer evaluating a
private school for her child could have objective information on sta⁄-pupil ratios,
its position in examination league tables and the number of sport teams it ￿elds,
yet not know if her child will thrive in the school￿ s particular disciplinary ethos.
Such customers typically have to try the good before they really knows what they
buy. Yet, this qualitative uncertainty is largely ignored in the club literature3.
The one club paper that treats qualitative uncertainty that we know, by Todd
Sandler, Frederic Sterbenz and John Tschirhart (1985), studies consumers who are
certain about their own membership but uncertain about the congestion they will
experience on any given visit. It focuses on the relationship between risk aversion
and capacity provision and not, as we do, on the endogenous determination of club
membership through the provider￿ s pricing and facility investment strategy. Also, it
explores neither the market provision of the club good nor members￿self-selection.
As our club good is an experience good that generates the frequency of future
visits to the club by its potential members, this paper is related to the literature
on experience goods and repeat buying. Jacques CrØmer (1984), Julia Liebeskind
and Richard Rumelt (1989), Thomas Hoerger (1993), Daniel Kr
::
ahmer (2002), J.





3This literature has dealt mainly with other important issues, such as multijurisdictionality
in large economies with many competing clubs, congestion externalities or tiered pricing (see,
e.g., Myrna Wooders (1978, 1999), Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler (1996), Suzanne Scotchmer
(1985) and Amihai Glazer, Esko Niskanen and Scotchmer (1997)).
2lyze how qualitative uncertainty associated with experience goods a⁄ects buyers￿
learning and intertemporal pricing by an imperfectly competitive ￿rm. But, none
compares the behaviour of a monopoly supplier of the experience good with that of
a benchmark supplier, such as a welfare maximizer4 . This comparison is important
for the fact that the monopolist￿ s and welfarist￿ s regimes di⁄er delimits the possible
con￿gurations of their choice variables.




aki, like us, look speci￿cally at the behavior
of a monopolist. CrØmer shows that a monopolist will not o⁄er ￿rst time buyers





aki show that a monopolist supplying an experience good actually faces
two types of markets: a mass market (where buyers are willing to buy at the full
information monopoly price) and a niche market (with uninformed buyers who are
not) where pricing strategies di⁄er. In the mass market, prices decline over time
whereas, in the latter, higher prices follow lower ones.





mass market result, the monopoly club provider will not make an "introductory
o⁄er" that allows consumers to "try before they buy," but the welfare maximizer
might (Proposition 1 and Observation 2). More speci￿cally, we consider the class
of club quality functions that are homogeneous in the facility investment and usage
of the club. We show that (Proposition 3), in this class, the welfare maximiser will
o⁄er a free trial period for all degrees of homogeneity that lead to feasible outcomes
(which necessitates homogeneity greater than or equal to minus unity). This is a
very strong result. Also, we show that, under plausible assumptions, if the degree
of homogeneity exceeds minus unity, the monopolist always invests in a greater
level of facility provision per use of the club than does the welfarist. In the much
discussed case of a quality function homogeneous of degree zero, this translates to
the monopolist over-investing in the quality provided to repeat buyers compared to
the welfare maximizer (Proposition 4).
4In fact, none of these authors analyse explicitly the case of club goods with speci￿c features
such as those mentioned in the paragraph above (although Cremer (1984) brie￿y mentions a club
as an example of an experience good).
3The key to these results is a very simple observation: the monopolist wants to
make pro￿ts, the welfarist to produce utility and ex post equality. The welfarist sets
a low (zero) trial price to, in essence, compensate those having such a poor trial that
they wish to leave the club. It might rather do that than set a higher (positive) trial
price that allows either greater break-even investment in the club facility (which
bene￿ts everyone, but those who remain members more), or reduce the price paid
by those who remain members, which bene￿ts only the latter. Conversely, for any
given investment in the facility, the monopolist just wants to maximise revenues.
By charging all those who try the good initially, it can reduce the price for those
who wish to remain consumers subsequently. It thereby perhaps induces some of
those with relatively bad trial experiences that it would otherwise lose to remain.
The other papers mentioned above, by Liebeskind and Rumelt (1989), Hoerger
(1993), Kr
::
ahmer (2002) and Villas-Boas (2004), have a di⁄erent angle from ours.
Liebeskind and Rumelt and Hoerger study the e⁄ects of product quality uncertainty
in the presence of adverse selection on the producers￿side, while Kr
::
ahmer and
Villas-Boas analyze how consumers￿learning in the presence of quality uncertainty
impacts on the pricing strategies of oligopolists.
In section 2, we present the basis of our two-period model and analyze ￿rst-time
visitors￿period 2 club membership decision. We show how membership is deter-
mined endogenously, depending on the provider￿ s price and quality strategy. We
also do comparative static analysis of the sensitivity of club membership to prices
and quality. In subsection 2.2, we study the monopolist￿ s pricing and investment
decisions and, in 2.3, those for the social welfare maximizer. We compare their
equilibrium pricing and investment decisions in 2.4. Section 3 presents our con-
clusions. The Appendix contains proofs and derives one of the key equations that
drive some of our main ￿ndings.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a two-period model of club membership in an economy with a single
private good and a single club good ("a club" for short) with a sole supplier. The
4private good is essential, but not the club. There are n consumers, n being very
large, who are identical ex ante and uncertain about the club￿ s quality. People
must join and experience the club to learn their evaluation of its quality, which
becomes their private information. So, ex-ante homogeneous consumers become
heterogenous in their valuation ex-post once they join. To ￿nd his evaluation (which
occurs perfectly rather than gradually), someone must visit the club a ￿xed number
of times (normalised at unity) in period 1, irrespective of the supplier. Given his
experience, he decides whether to remain a period 2 member or to quit, and how
many visits to make if he stays. Thus, part of our focus is on exit decisions.
We assume that a typical member has a strictly concave time-separable utility
function with per period utility given by U((xi;vi;c(";y;Vi)); where xi is his period
i￿ s consumption of the private good, i = 1;2, vi is the number of visits he makes
in period i, y is the quantity of the club good (equivalently, its facility size) that,
once provided, does not depreciate in value, Vi is the total number of visits made by
all members in period i, " is a random-valued parameter capturing the ￿ qualitative
uncertainty￿and c(";y;V ) is the quality or congestion function.
An example can clarify the three in￿ uences on c. If, say, the club is centred on
a swimming pool, everyone prefers a 50m pool to a 25m one, though it costs more
(a larger y). This is like vertical di⁄erentiation. But, depending on their realised
", some swimmers might ￿nd a given pool temperature too high, some too low and
others just right. This is like horizontal di⁄erentiation. Lastly, all might agree that,
from their standpoint, fewer swimmers (a smaller V ) are better than more - again
like vertical di⁄erentiation.
Assumption A1 speci￿es the utility function, A2 the distribution of " and A3
says that club quality increases in the facility size but decreases in crowding:
A1. The function U((xi;vi;c(";y;Vi)) is quasi-linear of the form U(:) = u(xi) +
"viC(y;Vi); with u(xi) being strictly concave.
A2. The parameter " is distributed over the interval [" , "] with density function
f(") and CDF F("): The supplier knows f and F, but not any individual￿ s
5realisation of ". Other things equal, c(";y;Vi) increases in ".
A3. Cy(y;V ) > 0;CV (y;V ) < 0:
The club good is supplied by a pro￿t-maximizing monopolist that acts as a
Stackelberg leader in choosing the level of provision y and prices pi for the periods
i = 1, 2 at the start of period 1. We consider only linear pricing5. Also, we assume
that the unit cost of providing the club good is constant at unity.
Let V denote the aggregate number of visits made in period 1 - i.e., ￿ V = n(= V1):
With Mi, i = 1;2, being the period i income of consumers, budget constraints of
a member in periods 1 and 2 are then, respectively:
M1 ￿ p1 = x1
and
M2 ￿ p2v2 = x2
The sequence of events is:
￿ Period 1. The leader sets y, p1and p2. People then decide to join (or not)
the club and make a visit. After experiencing it, they become heteroge-
neously (and privately) informed about its quality, based on which they decide
whether to stay in the club or to exit.
￿ Period 2. If a customer remains with the club, he then decides how many
visits to make in period 2, given his private valuation of it.
As each consumer￿ s realisation of " is private information, the ￿rm has no more
information about period 2￿ s demand at the start of period 2 than it did at the
start of period 1. So it cannot, on that score, gain from setting p2 at the start of
period 2 rather than period 1.
5As ￿rst period visits are ￿xed, a consumer e⁄ectively has to pay a lump sum to join the club
and try the club good. So, pricing has the ￿avour of intertemporal two-part pricing.
62.1. The members￿problem in period 2.
2.1.1. The exit decision and club membership
For convenience, we denote v2 by v and V2 by V from now on. Suppose each
member treats V (which is determined endogenously later) as parametric and
chooses v to maximize period 2 utility subject to the budget constraint6. For a
given p2 and y, we assume that both a supplier and consumers can infer the V that
will occur in an equilibrium. Additionally, given the large number of consumers, V
is taken to equal its expected value (or decision makers take it as so when making
their decisions). A typical member then solves the following in period 2:
max
v u(M2 ￿ p2v) + "vC(y;V )
The ￿rst order condition (FOC) yields:
￿p2ux2(M2 ￿ p2v) + "C(y;V ) 5 0 for v = 0 (1)
with ￿p2ux2(M2) + "C(y;V ) 5 0 if v = 0: Now, with quality taken as parametric,
￿p2ux2(M2) + "C(y;V ) is increasing in ": Then, given a plausible assumption on
C7 and a su¢ ciently wide support for f ("), there exists an "￿ such that
￿p2ux2(M2) + "C(y;V ) R 0 according as " R "￿:
Call "￿ 2 [";"] the marginal quality valuation - i.e., "￿ solves
￿p2ux2(M2) + "￿C(y;V ) = 0: (2)
So, "￿ just leaves the consumer indi⁄erent between choosing some club consumption
and not. Clearly, "￿ is a function of p2 and y (as well as other parameter values,
e.g., M2). Note that the number of visits at the marginal quality valuation is zero:
6Formally, this requires n to represent a continuum. None of the ensuing results change if we
explicitly treat the continuum case, but the mathematical notation is much complicated.
7We assume C(0;V ) > 0, " is su¢ ciently large so that " > p2ux(M2)=C(y;V ) holds for all
possible values of p2 and C:and " is su¢ ciently small (e.g., zero). Then "￿ is strictly between its
lower and upper bounds.
7v("￿) = 0: The following Lemma, proven in the Appendix, shows how period 2 club
membership gets determined depending upon the realization of ":
Lemma 1. (Single Crossing) Members with " = "￿ remain in the club, those
with " < "￿ exit.
A member who stays in the club has visits v = v (";p2;y;V ) solving
￿p2ux2(M2 ￿ p2v (";p2;y;V )) + "C(y;V ) = 0 (3)
Thus, ex ante (when seen from period 1), for a given p2 and y, the expected number




Denoting v(";p2;y;V ) by only v(") from now on, unless otherwise necessary, the





The only technical task remaining in this subsection is to prove the existence
and uniqueness of an equilibrium in expected visits for a given p2 and y. The
following Lemma is proven in the Appendix:
Lemma 2. For a given y and p2, a unique equilibrium in expected period 2 visits
exists.
2.1.2. Some comparative statics
The following comparative statics for consumers￿responses to magnitudes that
they take as parametric are used to solve the leader￿ s problem (see the Appendix):
Lemma 3. (i) @V=@y > 0; (ii) @V=@p2 < 0; (iii) @"￿=@y < 0; (iv) @v (")=@" >
0; (v) sign(@"￿=@p2) = sign(C + V CV ).
8Thus: (i) aggregate (and individual) visits increase with the level of facility
provision; (ii) an increase in second period price reduces aggregate (and individual)
visits; (iii) more people stay with the club if the level of provision increases; (iv)
period 2 demand for the club good increases with the favourableness of period 1￿ s
experience; (v) a change in the second period price has an ambiguous e⁄ect on how
many use the club. This is the result of independent interest. We show below that
p2 can be set at a level where a further increase would produce either a rise or no
change in club membership, depending on the club provider￿ s objective.
2.2. The monopolist￿ s problem
The monopolist acts as a Stackelberg leader, choosing (y; p1; p2) to maximize
its pro￿t knowing that members behave as described above. She maximizes subject
to the constraint that agents join the club in the ￿rst period. We con￿ne attention











subject to the participation constraint (PC):
u(M1 ￿ p1) + C(y;V )E(") + ￿
Z "
"￿
[u(M2 ￿ p2v(")) + "v(")C(y;V )]dF(") =
u(M1) + ￿u(M2)(1 ￿ F("￿)) (6)
Here, E(") =
R "
" "f(")d" and ￿ is the discount factor. Letting superscript "m"
show magnitudes for the monopolist, Lm the Lagrangian and ￿
m the multiplier,
Lm = nfp1 + ￿
Z "
"￿
p2v(")dF(")g ￿ y + ￿








8Our model is a full commitment one wherein the monopolist commits deterministically to
its pricing and quality strategies in period 1. We thereby rule out any "ratcheting e⁄ects" ￿ la
La⁄ont-Tirole - which normally give rise to mixed strategy equilibria in non-commitment games.




= n ￿ ￿
mux1 5 0 for pm





















￿ v (")ux2gdF(") = 0 for pm
2 = 0 (8)
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dF(") 5 ux1 for ym = 0: (9)
From equation (7), ￿
m = n=ux1 > 0. So, PC binds - thus (as expected),
consumers get no rent in equilibrium, whether pm
1 > 0 or not. Second, pm
2 > 0.
Otherwise, the demand for period 2 club visits would be in￿nite and this maximiza-
tion would have no solution. But can pm
1 be zero? I.e., could the monopolist make
an "introductory o⁄er" (interpreted as "a free trial period") on the club good?10
Proposition 1 (proven in the Appendix) shows the answer is no, for reasons stressed
in the Introduction: the monopolist wants to extract revenue from period 1 users
so it can make repeat buying more attractive in period 2.
Proposition 1. The monopolist does not make an introductory o⁄er on the
club good - i.e., pm
1 > 0:
Now, pm
2 > 0 implies (8) holds as an equality. Substituting ￿
m = n=ux1, using

















De￿ne the visit elasticity of quality by ￿v = V
C
@C
@V (< 0, since CV < 0). As
9The monopolist￿ s strategy space is closed and bounded and its objective and constraint func-
tions are continuous, so equilibria will exist and be characterised by these FOC￿ s. It is also easy
to see that these FOCs will identify an equilibrium in pure strategies. Consumers cannot de-
viate from it and improve welfare by not joining the club: their utility outside the club is just
the reservation expected utility they get from membership. Given consumers do not deviate, the
monopolist maximises pro￿t if satisfying these FOC￿ s.
10Note that pm








ux2v(")dF(")] < 0, we note the following about the mo-
nopolist￿ s period 2 pricing rule:
Observation 1. The monopolist sets pm





￿ ￿ = 1 is analogous to conditions found elsewhere -e.g., in the e¢ ciency
wage hypothesis. It is a marginal revenue = 0 condition. Having chosen y and
p1, the monopolist picks a p2 that maximizes V C, the quality-adjusted aggregate
expected visits, thereby maximizing consumers￿willingness to pay for the club good.
Lastly, we cannot rule out at this stage the possibility that ym can be zero.
2.3. A benchmark: social welfare maximisation (under an identical
informational constraint).
As a benchmark, consider the club good being provided by a benevolent social
welfare maximizer. Like the monopolist, she also knows members￿behaviour, as
described in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, but cannot observe agents￿ex-post valuation
of the good. (So, she cannot engage in discriminatory pricing ex post.) She uses
this information while solving the following social welfare maximization problem:
max
p1;p2;y













p2v(")dF(") > y (11)
Here (11) is the constraint that the expected revenue raised from the club good
must cover its provision cost. We can now reasonably ignore the participation
constraint (6) on the following ground. If it binds with a pro￿t maximizer making
positive pro￿ts, it will certainly be slack with a welfarist that just breaks even and
leaves some surplus with consumers. The optimal values of the choice variables
"￿, p2, etc., here will therefore generally di⁄er from the corresponding values in
11the monopolist￿ s problem. Let superscript "s" denote magnitudes in the welfarist￿ s
regime.






s 5 0 for ps





















gdF(")] 5 0 for ps
2 = 0 (13)
@Ls













@ys dF(") ￿ ￿
s 5 0 for ys = 0 (14)
By the same argument as with monopoly, ps
2 > 0 in equilibrium. So, (13) holds














s > 0 - i.e., the revenue constraint binds12. This, with ps
2 > 0,
implies ys > 0 at the welfarist￿ s optimum. So, (14) holds with strict equality.
Thus, members receive some rents at the welfarist￿ s optimum (as opposed to in
monopoly). But, as shown formally below with homogeneous C (:) (in Proposition
3), even with ￿
s > 0; (12) can have a corner solution. So we have
Observation 2. The welfarist could make an introductory o⁄er on the club good
(i.e., ps
1 = 0):
11As with monopoly (see note 9), the welfarist￿ s strategy space is compact and its objective and
constraint functions are continuous. So, equilibria exist and satisfy these FOC. Now, consumers
get positive expected surplus in the welfarist equilibrium. They cannot deviate and improve their
welfare by not joining the club. This just yields their reservation expected utility. Given consumers
do not deviate, the welfarist cannot do better than satisfy these FOC.
12To show that (14) indicates ￿s > 0, suppose not, thus ￿s = 0 by Kuhn-Tucker theory.





@ys gdF(")] 5 0. This cannot be, given
Cy + CV
@V
@ys > 0 and Cy > 0.
12Observation 2 helps us to prove the following in the Appendix:
Proposition 2. If the welfarist makes an introductory o⁄er, then she also sets
ps
2(> 0) so that j ￿v j> 1 holds. Further, there is ￿ overprovision￿of the good in
the Samuelson rule sense that willingness to pay for the marginal investment in the
club facility is less than its cost.
















gdF(")] = 0 (16)








2 gdF(") < 0. I.e., other things equal, the welfarist
could increase its expected revenue by lowering p2. The rationale is simple: if
V CV + C < 0 ()j ￿v j> 1, quality is very sensitive to visits at the welfarist￿ s
optimum and it will wish to discourage visits, other things equal. It can do so by
raising ps
2 to above the pro￿t-maximizing level, given its choice of ys and ps
1.
2.4. Monopolist￿ s versus welfarist￿ s equilibrium
At the monopoly equilibrium pm
1 > 0 and pm
2 > 0, although ym = 0 is possible;
at the social optimum ps
2 > 0 and ys > 0, while ps
1 =0 is possible. Also, all the
choice variables cannot simultaneously be positive for both the monopolist and the
welfarist.13 Thus, there are only three possible ways in which the monopolist￿ s
equilibrium can di⁄er from the social optimum:
1.Regime (a). pm
1 > 0; pm
2 > 0;ym > 0; ps
1 = 0; ps
2 > 0;ys > 0;
2. Regime (b). pm
1 > 0; pm
2 > 0;ym = 0; ps
1 = 0;ps
2 > 0;ys > 0; and
3. Regime (c). pm
1 > 0; pm
2 > 0;ym = 0; ps
1 > 0; ps
2 > 0;ys > 0:
2.5. The characterisation of di⁄erent regimes
This section explores which one(s) of the above regimes is (are) likely to occur
and their characteristics. We ￿rst study cases when the quality function, C(y;V ),
13Since that makes their ￿rst order conditions exactly identical, which cannot be possible given
that the monopolist maximises pro￿t while the welfarist breaks even!
13is homogeneous14. Our general result (proven in the Appendix) is the following:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the quality function C(y;V ) is homogeneous of
degree k. Then: (i) regime (c) cannot occur for any k; (ii) regime (b) occurs if and
only if k = ￿1; (iii) only regime (a) can occur for all k satisfying k + 1 > 0.
Although C (y;V ) might not be homogeneous, homogeneity is a convenient sim-
pli￿cation for visualising the consequences of di⁄erent extents of qualitative returns
to scale. An implication of Proposition 3 is that, with su¢ ciently large qualitative
scale diseconomies, the monopolist will ￿nd it suboptimal to invest in the club fa-
cility. E.g., if k = ￿1, doubling y and V keeps the facility provision per use of the
club constant but halves the quality as perceived by its customers, simply because
crowding per se causes them such detriment. The monopolist would then ￿nd it
more pro￿table to not spend on the facility and keep visits low if it wishes to main-
tain quality. But, an even more striking and important implication of Proposition 3
is: the welfarist will always o⁄er a free trial period for all degrees of homogeneity of
C (:) that lead to a feasible solution (which the Appendix shows requires k+1 ￿ 0).
This behaviour contrasts starkly with the monopolist￿ s, which (from Proposition 1)
never o⁄ers a free trial period whether or not C (:) is homogeneous.
In the context of Proposition 2, Proposition 3 means that the welfarist over-
supplies the club facility in the Samuelson rule sense for all feasible k. Conversely,
in regime (a), as ym > 0, (9) means that the monopolist￿ s provision satis￿es Samuel-
son￿ s rule. If k = ￿1, regime (b) holds. Then, (9) indicates that, generically, the
monopoly overprovides under this rule, although ym = 0. This seems paradoxical.
But, it just implies that any facility provision by the monopolist would be socially
excessive, given the con￿guration of its other choice variables. It also highlights the
well-known fact that Samuelson￿ s rule need not have a straightforward implication
in terms of levels of provision of a shared good.
In the arbitrary k-degree homogeneous case, the quality function satis￿es C (y:V ) =
V kc(y=V ) for some function c(:). It is easy to show that the monopolist then always
14Robert Barro and Paul Romer (1987), Clive Fraser (2000) and Serge-Christophe Kolm (1974),
among others, study some of the implications of homogeneous club quality or congestion functions.
14wishes to o⁄er a higher level of facility provision per visit than does the welfarist if
the facility provision elasticity of quality, (y=V )c= (y=V )=c(y=V ), is monotonic in
the facility provision per visit, z ￿ y=V . First, we show in the next Lemma (proven
in the Appendix) that zc= (z)=c(z) is decreasing in z at both the monopolist￿ s and
welfarist￿ s equilibrium. Hence, if it is monotonic, it must be decreasing everywhere.
Lemma 4. If there are diminishing returns to an investment in the facility pro-
vision (i.e., c== < 0) and the facility provision elasticity of quality, (y=V )c= (y=V )=
c(y=V ), is monotonic in z ￿ y=V , then it is decreasing everywhere.
If the conditions of Lemma 4 are satis￿ed, the monopolist will always invest in
a greater level of facility provision per visit than the welfarist: as their equilibria
satisfy zsc=(zs)=c(zs) > k + 1 = zmc=(zm)=c(zm), we must have zm > zs.
When C (:) is homogeneous of degree zero ("h.o.d.0") is much discussed. Then
quality just depends on the facility investment per use of the club. E.g., patients at
a health clinic might ￿nd the quality of care depends on the average time doctors
spend with each patient and average drug and equipment spending per treatment, or
swimmers might think the quality of a swimming pool is determined by the average
area each swimmer has to herself, and the construction cost per square metre of pool
is constant15. In the h.o.d.0. case, C(y;V ) = c(y=V ), for some function c(:);with
c= (y=V ) > 0. The following proposition is an immediate implication of Lemma 4
and the fact that zm > zs if the conditions of this Lemma are satis￿ed.
Proposition 4. If C (:) is h.o.d.0. and the elasticity of quality w.r.t. facility
provision is monotonic, then C (ym;V m) = c(ym=V m) > c(ys=V s) = C (ys;V s):
the monopolist invests in socially excessive quality provision for period 2.
The rationale for this result is that the monopolist both wishes to extract rent
from those who try in period 1 but not buy in period 2 (hence it sets pm
1 > 0)
and to provide an incentive for many period 1 tryers to remain period 2 buyers.
It can do this by ensuring a high period 2 quality, which relaxes the participation
constraint. The welfarist, conversely, is concerned about equity as well as e¢ ciency.
15Fraser (2000) and Kolm (1974) study implications of an h.o.d.0. C (y;V ) for club theory.
15It is interested in equalizing the actual utility of stayers and leavers as nearly as
possible. It prefers, therefore, to not charge in period 1, though this means relatively
less funds are available for facility provision to enhance period 2 quality.
By pricing in this way, the welfarist essentially operates a limited system of
random redistributive taxation. Only consumers with su¢ ciently good period 1
experiences are taxed to pay for the club good. Their tax increases with the
favourableness of their experience as their club demand increases in ". Indeed,
were transfers possible, the welfarist might wish to make ex post equalising trans-
fers to those who choose to not use the club in period 2 due to their bad period 1
experiences. It is limited for, by assumption, transfers are impossible and setting
ps
1 = 0 is the best it can do.
Surprisingly, this scenario is reminiscent of the literature on monopoly pricing
under asymmetric information where high prices signal high-quality product quality
(e.g., cf. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts 1986, Kyle Bagwell and Michael Rior-
dan 1991, Kenneth Judd and Riordan 1994). To signal the product quality, the
monopolist may charge a price well above the full information pro￿t maximizing
one. Ours is not a signalling model, yet it can have an observationally equivalent
implication. When the quality of the club good is yet to be learnt by visitors, the
monopolist credibly provides a higher quality club good than the welfarist would if
it charges a higher ￿rst period price than does the latter (i.e., pm
1 > ps
1 = 0).
An Example. Suppose C (y;V ) = [(y=V ) + ￿]
#, for some scalars ￿ < 0 and
# 2 (0;1). Then, it is easy to show16 that ym=V m =
￿
#￿1 > ys=V s, hence
C (ym;V m) = [(ym=V m) + ￿]
# > C (ys;V s) = [(ys=V s) + ￿]
#.
From Proposition 3, we know that homogeneity of C (:) severely restricts the
possibility of regimes (b) and (c). So, we will now suppose that C (y;V ) is not
homogeneous and that these regimes are possible. What might the characteristics
of these regimes be? We will make the following reasonable assumption:
16From (10), ￿(ym=V m)[￿ + (ym=V m)]#￿1 # + [￿ + (ym=V m)]# = 0 () ￿(ym=V m)# +
[￿ + (ym=V m)] = 0 () (ym=V m)(1 ￿ #) + ￿ = 0 () ym=V m =
￿
#￿1. Likewise, from Proposi-
tion 2, ￿(ys=V s)[￿ + (ys=V s)]#￿1 # + [￿ + (ys=V s)]# < 0, which simpli￿es to ys=V s <
￿
#￿1.
16A4. CV V 5 0 (increasing marginal disutility of congestion); CV y = 0 (increased
facility provision ameliorates the negative impact of increased club usage).17
In comparing monopoly and welfarist regimes now, the visit elasticity of quality
plays the same pivotal role as in the homogeneous case (cf. the proofs of Propo-
sitions 3-4 and Lemma 4). In regime (b), the inequality j ￿s
v j>j ￿m
v j= 1 holds
as j ￿m
v j= 1 by Observation 1 and j ￿s
v j> 1 by Proposition 2. Conversely, under
regime (c), j ￿s
v j= 1 (combining equations (12) and (13) when ps
1 > 0) - i.e., under
regime (c), j ￿s
v j=j ￿m
v j= 1 holds. We can use this, together with the properties
of ￿v when C is non-homogeneous, to show that monopoly will plausibly result in
less period 2 use of the club than is socially optimal in regimes (b) and (c).
To see how the elasticity ￿v ￿ V CV (y;V )=C (y;V ) behaves in response to
changes in y and V , we can totally di⁄erentiate and rearrange to obtain
d￿v = C￿2 ￿￿
CCV + CV CV V ￿ V C2
V
￿





CCV + CV CV V ￿ V C2
V
￿
< 0 and (CV CV y ￿ V CV Cy) >
0. Thus, other things equal, an increase in V will decrease ￿v (make it more nega-
tive), while increasing y will increase it. In both these regimes ym = 0: So, to com-
pare the monopolist and the welfarist￿ s behavior in them, we can let dy = ys > 0 =
ym. Then, to satisfy V mCV (0;V m)=C (0;V m) = ￿1 ￿ V sCV (ys;V s)=C (ys;V s)
and (17), we must have V s > V m. This establishes the following:
Proposition 5. Under regimes (b) and (c) and A4, the aggregate second period
visits to the club under monopoly are less than the socially optimal level: V m < V s:
Note that CV y = 0 in A.4 can not hold and yet we get V s > V m in regimes
(b) and (c): E.g., if C (y;V ) = h(y)=g (V ) for some positive increasing functions h
and g, then CV y = ￿h= (y)g= (V )=g (V )
2 < 0. Yet, direct calculation shows that
CV CV y ￿ V CV Cy = 0 in this case and, so, we must have V s > V m as before.
We cannot compare period 2 quality levels in regimes (b) and (c) because,
17We also assume C (0;V ) > 0. If not, regimes (b)-(c) could not occur as the monopolist would
not get any period 2 customers and the participation constraint could not be met if ym = 0.
17although ys > 0 = ym, V s > V m might still mean C (0;V m) > C (ys;V s) occurs.









holds: the welfarist o⁄ers a higher period 1 quality than the
monopolist in these regimes. This is consistent with the suggestion that, compared
with the welfarist, the monopolist is more focused on treating retained customers
well, even if at the expense of disappointed ￿rst period customers. These arguments
suggest that the monopolist could o⁄er a higher quality to repeat customers, yet
a lower quality to ￿rst-time and once-only customers, than does the welfarist. So,
unlike in a single-period model, we cannot say unambiguously that the monopolist
will over- or under-supply quality.
3. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the pricing and investment strategies of a club good provider
when potential club users are uncertain about the quality of the shared facility. Es-
sentially, club goods are experience goods: " you have to try before you know you
want to buy." Yet this aspect of clubs has not been studied in the literature. Incor-
porating this feature is important as it can give rise to very contrasting strategies
for a monopoly pro￿t maximizer and a welfare maximizer, as we have shown.
In our model, potential members are unsure of the quality of a club￿ s facilities
beforehand. They must make a ￿xed number of visits in period 1 to ascertain their
evaluation of the quality, which they then learn perfectly. Based on this learning
experience, they then decide whether to continue their membership and the number
of visits to make, or to leave the club for good. Pricing strategies announced in
period 1 and the investment the provider undertakes to maintain the shared facilities
are therefore crucial in determining the club￿ s ultimate membership.
In this scenario, one might expect a provider to o⁄er an introductory discount
to consumers who have no prior knowledge of the quality of the good they are about
to experience. But, we show that is not necessarily so - it depends upon who the
provider is. If it is a social welfare maximizer, she might indeed give consumers an
"introductory o⁄er" of a free trial period in which to decide whether it is agreeable
18to them - and de￿nitely does so if the quality function is homogeneous. She does
this to reduce the disparity in welfare between those who try the product, ￿nd it
unsatisfactory and therefore leave the club, and those who ￿nd it satisfactory and
wish to continue as consumers. In the extreme, only the latter pay for providing the
club facility. Conversely, if the provider is a monopolist, her focus is on extracting
as much rent as possible from consumers. As a result, the monopolist never makes
an introductory o⁄er. Thus all consumers, whether stayers or leavers, contribute to
any cost of facility provision and to pro￿ts. This enables the monopolist to increase
(in some cases) the size of the club facility (thereby its quality), therefore increasing
the incentive for consumers to remain with it.
The latter results about the monopoly provider are consistent with those from
models of monopoly pricing with experience goods and repeat purchases (such as




aki (2005)), and also with ones that
establish a signalling role about the future quality of the product played by today￿ s
price in a dynamic setting (such as Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Milgrom and
Roberts (1986) and Judd and Riordan (1994)). However, none of these other papers
have considered explicitly, as we have done, the implications of the peculiar features
of clubs - such as the congestion externality and the endogenous determination of
quality arising both from the utilization choice of members and the entrepreneurial
club provider￿ s pricing strategy and level of facility provision.
It is worth stressing again, ￿nally, that archetypal clubs like leisure facilities are
not the only ones with characteristics that might be unveri￿able prior to use. For
example, the ethos of a school and its teachers￿dedication can make a di⁄erence
to its quality, whatever the resources spent on books and other equipment. Simul-
taneously, di⁄erent consumers of the same services might take contrasting stances
on the balance between concentration on the "3 Rs" and, say, pastoral care at a
chosen establishment. In the same vein, many welfare states try to ensure equal-
ity of opportunity to ex ante identically treated individuals by providing a ￿xed
amount of primary and secondary education free at the point of delivery. Only those
consumers who reveal a preference or a particular aptitude for education have to
19pay for additional amounts in the tertiary system. The predictions of our welfarist
analysis in the homogeneous case mimics this scenario. Our model therefore pro-
vides a rationalisation for why we observe partial tax ￿nancing of such goods and
partial ￿nancing by user charges, a rationalisation di⁄erent from that based on ex
ante di⁄erences between consumers.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. The marginal quality valuation, "￿, satis￿es ￿p2ux2(M2)+
"￿C(y;V ) = 0 ((2) in the text). Given p2 and C; ￿p2ux2(M2)+"C(y;V ) is increas-
ing in " and equals zero at " = "￿: Hence, for " > "￿, ￿p2ux2(M2￿p2v)+"C(y;V ) =
210 can be satis￿ed for some v > 0: But this implies that members having " = "￿
remain in the club and make positive visits (the marginal member "remains" in the
club but makes zero visit). Obviously, for " < "￿, members make zero visits and
exit the club as ￿p2ux2(M2) + "C(y;V ) < 0.￿
Proof of Lemma 2. For a given p2; y and V , the club usage choice of some-
one with experience " is a continuous and di⁄erentiable mapping v(";p2;y;V ) :
[0;M2=p2] ! [0;M2=p2] satisfying (3):The ex ante expected visits for this consumer
satisfy (4) and those for all consumers must satisfy V = n
R "
"￿ v(";p2;y;V )dF(")
uniquely if a unique equilibrium exists. De￿ne the aggregate expected visit mapping
V (p2;y;V ) by V (p2;y;V ) = n
R "
"￿ v(";p2;y;V )dF(") : [0;nM2=p2] ! [0;nM2=p2].










0, using (3) and Leibnitz￿ s rule. So, V (p2;y;V ) is monotonically decreasing in
V and takes it maximum value at V (p2;y;0), where nM2=p2 > V (p2;y;0) > 0,
with the ￿rst inequality following from the fact that the private good is essential.
As nM2=p2 > V (p2;y;0) > V (p2;y;nM2=p2), the graph of V (p2;y;V ) against V
must cross the 450 line uniquely from above at a point where V (p2;y;V ) = V .
Thus, a unique equilibrium in expected visits exists for a given p2 and y. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Di⁄erentiation of (5) with respect to y; (using Leib-

























































22So, as the level of provision increases, both individual and aggregate visits increase.




































































(iv) By (3) in the text, p2
2uxx@v (")=@"+C = 0, so @v (")=@" = ￿C=p2
2uxx > 0.

































= signfC + CV V g Q 0 (25)
Proof of Proposition 1. As the participation constraint binds in equilibrium
(whether or not pm




[u(M2 ￿ p2v(")) + "v(")C(y;V ) ￿ u(M2)]dF(")
= u(M1) ￿ U(M1 ￿ p1) ￿ C(y;V )E(")
23If pm
1 = 0, then the RHS will be strictly negative while the LHS will be strictly
positive, given that for " > "￿ the person get more utility in the club than out.
This would violate the participation constraint. Hence pm
1 > 0.￿





















Rearranging and cancelling n￿ > 0, this becomes
Z "
"￿













































the last equation can be written as
Z "
"￿






















































Now, from the ￿rst and second terms,
Z "
"￿








































































= (using " = pm
































































































































(again using " = pm
2 ux2=C)


















25which is (10) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) First, we show that if ps
1 = 0 then us
x1 > ￿
s:
Suppose otherwise, so ps
1 = 0 yet us
x1 = ￿
s. Suppose the welfarist were then to
increase ps
1 to ps
1 = " > 0, for some very small ". To ￿rst-order, the loss of welfare
in ￿rst period utility is exactly counter-balanced by the value of extra funds, ￿
s.
Thus the welfarist could equally well set ps
1 = " > 0, contradicting the unique
optimality of ps



















































< 0 )j ￿v j>
1 as CV < 0:
(ii) Using the fact that us
x1 > ￿
s for ps
1 = 0, equation (14) - which holds with




















The left hand side is the (expected) marginal ￿ valuation￿of increased facility provi-
sion. The ￿rst n[:] term is the expected bene￿t from increased facility size (taking
into account any direct and indirect impact on quality, the latter from any induced








@ys dF("), is the valuation of the expenditure on extra visits induced
by the increased facility provision. The right hand side is the utility value of the
cost incurred to increase the facility size. There is overprovision of the club good
in the Samuelson rule sense since the valuation of the good induced by an increase
26in facility size falls short of the cost of providing that increase in the facility.￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Our proof strategy is to show, ￿rst, that if C (y;V ) is
homogeneous, then the monopolist￿ s behaviour under regimes (b)-(c) (i.e., ym = 0)
occurs i⁄ C (y;V ) is homogeneous of degree ￿1 (abbreviated "h.o.d.￿1"). We then
show that C (y;V ) being h.o.d.￿1 is inconsistent with the welfarist￿ s behaviour
under regime (c). So, if C (y;V ) is h.o.d.￿1, then only regime (b) holds. For all
other k, only regime (a) is possible. But, the monopolist￿ s behaviour under regime
(a) is only consistent with C (y;V ) being h.o.d.k , where k + 1 > 0.
Suppose that C(y;V ) is h.o.d.k. i.e.
C(ty;tV ) = tkC(y;V ) for all t > 0 (26)
Then, by Euler￿ s theorem,
yCy + V Cv = kC(y;V ) (27)
At the monopoly equilibrium: j￿m
v j = 1 ) V mCm
v = ￿C(ym;V m): Substituting
in (27) then yields:
ymCm
y = (k + 1)C(ym;V m) (28)
Proof of part (i): regime (c) cannot occur for any k.
In regime (c), pm
1 > 0; pm
2 > 0;ym = 0; ps
1 > 0; ps
2 > 0;ys > 0:With ym = 0
for the monopolist and C(0;V ) > 0 (see footnote 4), (28) then implies the only
possible value of k, for this regime to occur is k = ￿1:However, as ps




v +1] = 0 ) V sCs
v = ￿Cs for the welfarist which then yields, similar to
the monopoly case, the following form of (27): ysCs
y = (k + 1)C(ys;V s) ) ys = 0
if k = ￿1 thereby contradicting the fact that ys > 0 in this regime.
Proof of part (ii): regime (b) occurs if and only if k = ￿1:
In regime (b), pm
1 > 0; pm
2 > 0;ym = 0; ps
1 = 0; ps
2 > 0;ys > 0:The ￿ )￿ part:
If k = ￿1, then (28) implies ymCm
y = 0: As Cy(0;V ) > 0 by (A3), we must have
ym = 0:This means, from the monopolist￿ s point of view, both regimes (b) and
27(c) are possible. However, as just shown above, with k = ￿1; for the welfarist,
regime (c) is not possible. Therefore, the only candidate for a plausible regime,
when k = ￿1 is regime (b). We need to verify that ys > 0 is consistent with regime
(b). We do that as follows: By part (i) of the proof of proposition 2, at the welfarist




v + 1] < 0 ) V sCs
v + Cs < 0 (29)
Now, from (27), ysCs
y + V sCs
v = kC(ys;V s): Rewrite this by adding C(:) on
both sides,
ysCs
y + V sCs
v + C(ys;V s) = (k + 1)C(ys;V s) (30)
i:e:, V sCs
v + C(ys;V s) = (k + 1)C(ys;V s) ￿ ysCs
y (31)
Then, using (29),
(k + 1)C(ys;V s) ￿ ysCs
y < 0 (32)
i:e:, (k + 1)C(ys;V s) < ysCs
y (33)
When k = ￿1; (33) )
ysCs
y > 0 ) ys > 0 as Cs
y > 0 (34)
Thus, if C is h.o.d.￿1, then only regime (b) holds.
Proof of part (iii): Only regime (a) can occur for all k satisfying k + 1 > 0:
We know from parts (i)-(ii) that we can rule out regimes (b) and (c) i⁄ k+1 6= 0.
So, if k + 1 6= 0, only regime (a) can occur and we must have ps
1 = 0; ym > 0, and
ys > 0. Now, for the monopolist, ymCm
y = (k + 1)Cm (equation (28)) implies
ym > 0 , k + 1 > 0, by (A.3). ￿
Proof of Lemma 4 By de￿nition, if C (:) is homogeneous of arbitrary degree
k, then C (y;V ) = V kc(y=V ) for some function c(:). As V mCm
V + Cm = 0 at
28the monopoly equilibrium and CV = kV k￿1c(y=V ) ￿ yV k￿2c(y=V ) then, using
zm ￿ ym=V m; zmc=(zm)=c(zm) = k + 1. Likewise, as V sCs
V + Cs < 0 at the









zC (z)C== (z) + C= (z)
￿
C (z) ￿ zC= (z)
￿￿
. As




=dz < 0 must hold. Like-




=dz < 0 also. Therefore, if
zC= (z)=C (z) is monotonic, it must be decreasing everywhere. ￿
29